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The theme of these comments is derived from the name of the sponsoring 
body, The Pepperdine University Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and the 
Law.  Modern asset protection in the United States and the Cook Islands in all 
senses reflects the import of those three words: business, entrepreneurship and law.  
I.  HISTORY OF THE LAW 
In 1989, the Cook Islands enacted the International Trusts Amendment Act 
(“ITAA”),1 which amended the basic bare bones International Trusts Act (“ITA”),2 
enacted in 1982 when, as a result of a private initiative endorsed by the 
government, the Cook Islands parliament passed several companion acts 
establishing the offshore finance center.3  “Bare bones” does not, by the way, mean 
“bare trust”; the rule in Saunders v. Vautier4, whereby beneficiaries are absolutely 
                                                          
1 International Trusts Amendment Act 1989 (Cook Is.) [hereinafter ITAA]. 
2 International Trusts Act 1984 (Cook Is.) [hereinafter ITA]. 
3 Other legislation included the International Companies Act 1981-82, the Trustee Companies Act 
1981-82, the Offshore Banking Act 1981, the Offshore Insurance Act 1981-82 and the International 
Partnerships Act 1984.  See also The Limited Liability Companies Act 2008.  
4 Craig & Ph. 240, 10 L. J. Ch. (N.S.) 354 (1841).  
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entitled to call for distribution of assets, which was repealed in the ITA.5 
The Cook Islands has a unicameral parliamentary model inherited from the 
United Kingdom via New Zealand, which governed the Cook Islands until 1965 
when the Cook Islands became self-governing and two countries entered into an 
arrangement of “free association.”6  While the Cook Islands has full and 
independent law-making capacity, the country is somewhat less than fully 
independent of New Zealand.  Cook Islands law is an amalgam of adopted New 
Zealand statute law, New Zealand and English common law, Cook Islands statutes 
and a small body of Cook Islands common law.  The ITA as amended is thus a 
statutory overlay to an existing body of English and New Zealand statute and 
common law including Cook Islands precedent as it relates to trusts. 
The first business emphasis of the Cook Islands offshore center was on 
corporations, which enjoyed tax advantages for clients in New Zealand, Australia 
and elsewhere because of a simple and easily managed “control and management” 
test then-employed in those countries.7  In 1988, those advantages were removed 
when New Zealand adopted U.S. “controlled foreign corporation” concepts in their 
tax law.8 
At about that time, a U.S. attorney’s interest in the toll of litigation on 
medical practitioners in this country led to meetings with a Cook Islands trust 
company.  They agreed to draft legislation using trusts as the vehicle that, when 
passed by the Cook Islands parliament, would be tailored to protect U.S. clients 
from the ravages of random litigation in a legal environment where no entity could 
offer protection against potentially ruinous claims.9  
Here we have a true meeting of entrepreneurial minds resulting in the ITAA 
1989.10  While this was not the first time legislation in one country had been tailor-
made to suit the requirements and aspirations of those in another,11 it does 
represent something of a milestone in the innovative use of law in an offshore 
finance center to attract a clientele in another domestic jurisdiction, in this case the 
U.S. 
The attraction to government in such a process is obvious.  It gets annual 
registration fees, domestic taxes from the trust companies and their employees, and 
overall economic development is promoted.  As well, trust companies have little or 
no physical or sociological impact on small island countries and the domestic tax 
base is preserved because offshore services are usually available only to non-
                                                          
5 ITA § 10. 
6 See COOK IS. CONST. (1964).   
7   See New Zealand Government Budget, Wellington, Government Printer, June 1987. 
8    Income Tax Amendment Act 1988, New Zealand; see the Income Tax Act 1994, subpart CG 
and Schedule 5, part A, New Zealand. 
9   See Walter H. Diamond, Dorothy B. Diamond, & Barry A. Kaplan, 1 International Trust Laws 
and Analysis, 1000, (1995). 
10   ITAA. 
11 On their independence beginning in the 1960’s, the UK Government established tax havens in 
several former colonies as a means of attracting sustainable revenues to small countries otherwise bereft 
of resources. 
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residents.12  Trust companies operate relatively high value businesses with 
relatively few expatriate employees compared to other economic activities.   
Trusts were chosen as the vehicle because property is legally held by one 
party, the trustee, for the benefit of others, the beneficiaries.  Ownership is split 
between mutually interdependent legal and beneficial interests.  A trust is not an 
entity like a corporation with a separate legal personality, but a legal relationship 
between the parties.13  That relationship is essentially one of contract.14  Thus, 
while the settlor is no longer the legal owner of trust property, he may still be a 
beneficiary subject to contractual terms.  
II.  AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW 
The ITAA significantly modified the ITA and Cook Islands common law.15  
For starters, the rule against perpetuities was abolished, although a vesting period 
may be included in a trust agreement if desired.16  
Further, after the amendments, a trust17 is no longer void on a settlor’s 
bankruptcy.18  Thus, the rights of a beneficiary in a spendthrift trust are not subject 
to seizure or attachment due to bankruptcy or insolvency.19 
Section 13B(1)(a) added a provision allowing for law suits against trusts 
and/or settlors predicated on an assertion of a fraudulent conveyance.  This 
provision applies to situations where the plaintiff-creditor asserts that the settlor 
fraudulently transferred property to the trust to bring about his insolvency and 
avoid the creditor’s claim.20  If the creditor’s claim is proved,21 the trust is not void 
                                                          
12 See, e.g., ITA § 22. 
13 See Knight v. Knight, 49 E.R. 58, 3 Beav. 148 (1840). 
14 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627 
(1995). 
15   See, David Brownbill, The Role of Offshore Jurisdictions in the Development of the 
International Trust, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, V.32 1999. 
16   ITAA § 6(1). 
17 Reference to a trust throughout means an international trust as defined in section 2 of the ITA.  
Section 2 provides that an international trust is: 
a trust which is registered under this Act and in respect of which:  
(a) at least one of the trustees, including a custodian trustee, or in the case of a 
disposition granting powers of appointment, maintenance or advancement, at least one 
of the donors or holders of a power of appointment or power of maintenance or power 
of advancement, is either:  
(i) a registered foreign company; or  
(ii) an international company; or  
(iii) a trustee company; and  
(b) the beneficiaries are at all times non-resident; and shall include, where the context 
so permits, a trust which is established or settled under the laws of another jurisdiction, 
but which, subject to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition, is registered as an 
international trust under this Act; 
ITA § 11(2).  This definition includes dispositions made in a trust.  Id.  
18 Id. § 13A. 
19 Id. § 13F. 
20 Id. § 13B(1). 
21 The standard of proof is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. § 13(B)(1). 
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or voidable – the claim must be satisfied from that portion of the trust assets 
equivalent to the amount claimed using a market value test.22  No other remedy is 
permitted.  Therefore, the possibility that the plaintiff’s remedy will be in the form 
of a constructive or resulting trust is eliminated.  Moreover, a trust shall not be 
void or voidable because it may defeat a claim held by reason of a settlor’s 
personal relationship to the settlor or heirship rights.23  
The amendments to the ITAA also addressed the time frame within which a 
fraud suit may be brought.  The amendments provide that a trust shall not be 
deemed settled with intent to defraud a creditor if settled after two years from the 
date the creditor’s cause of action arose or, if within two years, the creditor fails to 
commence proceedings before one year from the date the trust was established.24  
A trust settled before the creditor’s cause of action arose is not settled with intent 
to defraud;25 that is, claims based on “future fraud” are prohibited.26  A settlor shall 
not have imputed to him an intent to defraud solely by reason that27 the settlor (1) 
settled the trust within two years of the creditor’s cause of action arising; (2) 
retains certain powers of control and disposition; (3) is a beneficiary, trustee or 
protector; or (4) the settlor settled the trust at a time when proceedings by the 
creditor had been commenced.  Proceedings to set aside a trust must be brought in 
the Cook Islands within two years of from the date of settlement of or disposition 
to the trust.28 
The ITAA amendments also established a number of procedural changes.  
The standard of proof required in a fraud claim is “beyond reasonable doubt.”  
Beyond a reasonable doubt is a higher burden than “balance of possibilities” used 
in civil cases and is usually reserved for criminal proceedings.29  To have locus 
standi,30 a plaintiff action must be brought within two years of a trust’s 
establishment, or within one year of the plaintiff’s cause of action having arisen.31  
Trusts and proceedings involving trusts are subject to stringent privacy provisions 
including the requirement that proceedings be held in camera32 and that only 
reports approved by both counsel and the judge may be published.33  In an attempt 
to highlight the security of trusts from government taking, the Crown guaranteed 
                                                          
22 ITAA § 13B(1). 
23 Id. § 3E(2)-(4). 
24 Id. § 13B(3). 
25 Id. § 13B(4) 
26 Note: this revokes application of the Statute of Elizabeth.  Fraudulent Conveyances Act 1571, 13 
Eliz. 1 Cap. 5 (1571). 
27 ITAA § 13B(5). 
28 Id. § 13K(D)(1)-(2). 
29 Id. § 13B(1). 
30 Locus standi is Latin for “standing,” that is, “[t]he right to bring an action or to be heard in a 
given forum.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 960 (8th ed. 2004).   
31 ITAA § 13K. 
32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 775 (8th ed. 2004) provides a useful definition of in camera: “1. In 
the judge’s private chambers. 2. In the courtroom with all spectators excluded. 3. (Of a judicial action) 
taken when court is not in session.”  Essentially, this definition shows the increased privacy accorded to 
proceedings held in camera.    
33 ITAA § 23(2). 
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that there should be no expropriation of the property of trusts except in accordance 
with due process of law, done for a public purpose, and with compensatory 
payment.34 
With regard to foreign judgments, a creditor seeking to enforce a claim 
relying on a foreign judgment may not enforce such claim until it can be shown 
that the creditor has exhausted all rights of appeal against the foreign judgment and 
all available remedies against the settlor’s remaining property.35  Moreover, 
foreign punitive damage awards are disregarded and unenforceable.36  In an 
apparent attempt to reinforce the supremacy of domestic judgments, the ITAA 
amendments further provide that no foreign judgment is enforceable if the 
judgment is inconsistent with the ITA or the Trustee Companies Act, or relates to a 
matter governed by the laws of the Cook Islands.37  ITAA § 13I goes on to state 
that no trust governed by Cook Islands law shall be void or voidable by reason that 
the trust avoids or defeats rights or claims conferred by a foreign jurisdiction or 
that the laws of the Cook Islands are inconsistent with any foreign law.38  The 
amendments do not completely discount foreign law or judgments.  Property that 
was “community property”39 in a foreign jurisdiction before transfer to a trust may 
retain that status.40  
III.  DUE DILIGENCE 
Before a trust may be registered under the ITA41 the concerned trust 
company must be satisfied42 that the settlor has full right and title to the assets; that 
he remains solvent and able to pay reasonably anticipated debts after transfer of the 
assets to the trust; that the assets are not derived from prescribed unlawful 
activities;43 that the information provided by the settlor is correct; and that the 
settlor has fully disclosed existing or reasonably anticipated legal proceedings 
against him.44  The settlor must provide an affidavit of solvency and an affidavit as 
                                                          
34 Id. § 27A; see also COOK IS. CONST. part IVA, § 64(1)(c). 
35 ITAA § 13B(13). 
36 Id. § 13B(14).  Punitive damage jury awards in the U.S. are essentially unrestrained compared to 
the stringent rules limiting their application in other common law jurisdictions where financial 
punishment is conventionally a state prerogative expressed through the criminal law.  See generally 
ERIK MOLLER ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN FINANCIAL INJURY JURY VERDICTS (Rand Corp. 1997), 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2007/MR889.pdf (last visited May 19, 
2010).   
37 ITAA § 13D. 
38 Id. § 13I. 
39 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 317 (9th ed. 2009).  Community property is “[a]ssets owned in 
common by husband and wife as a result of its having been acquired during the marriage by means 
other than an inheritance or a gift to one spouse, each spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the 
property.”  Id. 
40 ITAA § 13J. 
41 Id. § 15 
42 See Trustee Companies Due Diligence Regulations (1996) Reg. 4. 
43 Id. at 2.  “Unlawful activities” include “financial misconduct” which includes concealment of 
assets.  Id. at 7. 
44   Id. at 2. 
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to title and source of assets.45 
Trust company practice is to accept client referrals only from attorneys who 
are presumed to have adequately advised their clients on domestic rights duties and 
obligations.  That, together with compliance with the due diligence requirements, 
is intended to prevent the use of trust registration as a device for fraud. 
IV.  RESPONSE TO THE AMENDMENTS 
As stated in Newton’s Third Law of Motion, “To every action there is an 
equal and opposite reaction.”46 
Arguably, the most significant amendments are those imposing restrictive 
standards on litigation involving a settlor and trust and those disallowing deemed 
assumptions regarding a settlor’s intentions.  One need only compare the prospects 
of a trust governed by U.S. law under challenge to one governed by Cook Islands 
law.47 
The melding together of treatments for specific problem areas of U.S. law 
with robust amendments to English common law concepts brought criticism not 
only in the United States, but also in the English common law world.48  Equally, it 
drew great interest, particularly from U.S. attorneys; so much so that a 
subcommittee on asset protection planning of the American Bar Association 
Section of Real Property Trust and Estate Law was established.  A burgeoning 
conference circuit devoted to asset protection trusts developed in the 1990s.  
Scholarly articles emerged,49 and business students will recognize the indicia of 
the beginning of a “product cycle.”50 
While more pragmatic American lawyers appeared to simply want 
convincing that Cook Islands asset protection trusts actually worked, English 
lawyers harrumphed about what they saw as the torn tapestry of ancient equitable 
principals,51 and in particular the channeling of all claims under the ITA into a 
single funnel of expression.52  In the end, if an end is ever possible in legal debate, 
it has been recognized that, history notwithstanding, the “irreducible core” of 
obligations owed by trustees to the beneficiaries is the “duty of trustees to perform 
the trusts honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”53 
                                                          
45 Id. at 4–6. 
46 SIR ISAAC NEWTON, PHILOSOPHIAE NATURALIS PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA (1687). 
47 For a sampling of U.S. cases, see In re Brooks, 217 B.R. 98 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998); In re 
Brown, No. 95-03072, 1996 WL 33657614 (Bankr. D. Alaska Mar. 11, 1996); In re Lawrence, 227 
B.R. 907 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); Riechers v. Riechers, 679 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1998). 
48 See, e.g., PETER WILLOUGHBY, MISPLACED TRUST, (Gostick Hall Publ’ns 1999). 
49 See, e.g., Michael A. Spielman, Understanding Asset Protection Planning,A.B.A. SEC. REAL 
PROP. PROB.& TR. L. (2007) (presented at the 18th Annual Estate Planning Symposium). 
50 See Raymond Vernon, International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle, 
80 Q. J. ECON. 190 (1966). 
51 See Charles A. Cain, Trusts and Quasi-Trusts–What to Use and When, 1 TR. & TRUSTEES & 
INT’L ASSET MGMT. 6 (1994). 
52 ITAA § 13B(3). 
53 Armitage v. Nurse, (1998) Ch. 241, 253 (A.C.). 
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More compelling than the often-flawed lawyerly criticism,54 is the evidence 
of acceptance through competitive forces at work.  The advantage seized by the 
Cook Islands was quickly recognized by other offshore jurisdictions.  Many simply 
adopted the whole ITA with a change of name.55  There are now some sixteen 
offshore jurisdictions with some form of asset protection trust law.56  None, 
though, has law as complete as the ITA which has been updated several times.57  
While most jurisdictions do not publish actual numbers of trust registrations, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that none have been as successful in attracting 
business as the Cook Islands. 
As well as offshore jurisdictions, eight U.S. states now have forms of asset 
protection laws.58  Unfortunately for U.S. domestic planning, there is currently no 
definitive U.S. Supreme Court opinion as to whether these state laws meet the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution.59  Furthermore, there are the obstacles 
of the Supremacy Clause,60 which allows federal bankruptcy law to prevail over 
state laws, and of the Contracts Clause,61 which precludes state laws from 
interfering with contractual obligations. 
It was not until 2004 that the efforts of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws resulted in a Uniform Trust Code, which 
even in 2008 had been substantially adopted by only twenty states. 
From a U.S. perspective, while Internal Revenue Service reporting rules 
changed for foreign grantor trusts in 1996,62 the government has otherwise 
evidently seen no need for a particular response to the development of asset 
protection trusts and relies on robust federal bankruptcy law.63 
Developments have, however, evolved in the financial area, and while not 
specific to trusts, have affected their operation, if not their effectiveness.  In the 
1990s, the Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”),64 a body organized under the 
auspices of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(“OECD”) itself, a group of twenty-eight countries of which the United States is a 
                                                          
54 See Cain, supra note 54; Charles A. Cain, Which Domicile?–A Crucial Question for APTs, 1 Tr. 
& TRUSTEES 6 (1995). 
55 See Nevis International Exempt Trust Ordinance, 1994 (Nevis), available at 
http://www.nevisfinance.com/PDFS/NIETO%20%281994%29%20as%20Amended%20to%202002.pdf
. 
56 Such jurisdictions include Belize, Samoa, Mauritius, Cyprus, Turks & Caicos, and Gibraltar. 
57 To illustrate, the ITA has been updated in 1991, 1995–96, 1999, and 2004.  See ITA. 
58 These states include Delaware, Alaska, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, and Utah.  See also Asset Protection Corporation, Asset Protection Overview – State by State, 
http://www.assetprotectioncorp.com/apbystate.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
 
59 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
60 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
61 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
62 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
63 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978); Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
64 See Financial Action Task Force, http://www.FATF-GAFI.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
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member, began pressing for the removal of what were then called harmful tax 
practices and strengthened anti-money-laundering law in offshore centers.  The 
FATF was established following the debacle of the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (“BCCI”) scandal,65 and significant World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (“IMF”) funding in Eastern Europe following the collapse of the 
then-USSR, as it became apparent that significant portions of the funding had been 
quite simply looted and routed elsewhere via offshore centers. 
While the OECD move against offshore centers’ allegedly harmful tax 
practices (a hotly debated proposition that low tax jurisdictions unfairly harmed 
high tax jurisdictions) suffered early setbacks and was put aside for a time, the 
anti-money-laundering move gathered strength and resulted in publication by the 
FATF of a black-list of countries that, it said, had no such laws, inadequate laws, 
or were “uncooperative.”  Adoption of the list by the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network of the U.S. Department of the Treasury resulted in many 
American banks refusing, for a time, transactions to and from listed countries. 
After the events of September, 11, 2001, Congress passed the Patriot Act.66  
In the international arena, the FATF was then naturally placed to assume greater 
responsibility for anti-money-laundering processes, and removal from the “black-
list” became an urgent imperative for those countries listed under threat of losing 
the ability to conduct ordinary banking transactions in U.S. dollars (“USD”). 
In the Cook Islands, this process resulted (with assistance from the IMF) in 
the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Unit,67 other new or upgraded 
legislation68 and satisfaction of FATF requirements. 
In 2008–09, the OECD and FATF renewed the campaign against low-tax 
jurisdictions’ allegedly harmful tax practices, this time focusing on exchange of 
information and adopting the proven threat of black-listing from its anti-money-
laundering campaign.  The result was a flurry of tax treaty agreements 
incorporating exchange of information protocols, Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements (“TIEA”) by and between offshore jurisdictions, domestic trading 
partners, and complete stranger countries, all seeking to meet the FATF minimum 
of ten such treaties by the end of 2009.  That date has passed, but the process 
continues without penalty to any country thus far. 
The Cook Islands has currently entered into treaties with New Zealand, 
Australia, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the Nordic Council (Iceland, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands).  It intends, in 2010, 
to enter into TIEAs with Mexico, Greece, Italy, and Korea.  When enabling 
legislation has been enacted, a peer review process will be undertaken to verify 
efficacy of implementation of the TIEAs. 
Unfortunately for OECD/FATF policy makers, it is apparent that countries 
concerned about possible black-listing are entering into agreements with other 
                                                          
65 See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., THE BCCI AFFAIR, (S. Print 1992). 
66 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
67 See Financial Transactions Reporting Act 2003 (Cook Is.) 
68 See id.; see also Banking Act 2003 (Cook Is.); Financial Supervisory Commission 
(Qualifications of Compliance Officers) Regulations 2004 (Cook Is.); Money Changing and Remittance 
Businesses Act 2009 (Cook Is.); Insurance Act 2008 (Cook Is.). 
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countries with which they have no trade or other natural ties simply to meet or 
exceed the TIEA target. 
V.  COOK ISLANDS CASES69 
The High Court of the Cook Islands was established pursuant to the 
Constitution.70 
Judges must be or have been judges of the High Court, Supreme Court, or 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand, or practicing as a barrister in New Zealand or in 
any other part of the Commonwealth71 for not less than seven years.  Since 1965, 
only judges or former judges of the High Court of New Zealand have been 
appointed judges of the High Court of the Cook Islands. 
This procedure has provided the Cook Islands with a well-qualified judiciary 
on the one hand, and on the other avoided, thus far, the sometimes regrettable 
lapses evident in some offshore jurisdictions where there is a locally appointed 
judiciary that is perhaps inexperienced or even beholden to local or other interests.  
While these factors are by no means peculiar to offshore jurisdictions,72 
prospective clients are typically alert to potential ethical influences. 
Reporting on Cook Islands proceedings involving trusts is subject to the 
ITA.73  The decision of the court in any proceedings may, unless ordered otherwise 
by the court as to the whole or any part of the decision, be published.74  In practice, 
this means that counsel agree on amendments to the decision, which, when 
approved by the presiding judge, may be published.  Counsel invariably delete 
reference to names and other aspects that might identify parties. 
Reference is made in these reports to a “Mareva injunction.”75  This is a 
temporary court order, usually sought ex parte, that freezes assets in the hands of a 
defendant to prevent their dissipation or removal from the jurisdiction pending a 
substantive hearing.  The order originates in English admiralty law, where the 
order prevented the asset, a ship, from simply leaving the jurisdiction.  The related 
“Anton Piller” order freezes documents in the hands of a defendant pending a 
substantive hearing.76  The U.S. equivalent is a “temporary restraining order.” 
                                                          
69 The Cook Islands does not have an official law reporting service.  Cases referred to in this 
section are cited by reference to nomenclature of the Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute 
(“PacLII”), an initiative of the University of the South Pacific School of Law at Vila, Vanuatu.  See 
Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute, http://www.paclii.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). 
70 See supra Part IV. 
71 Other parts of the Commonwealth include an association of the United Kingdom and former 
colonies of the United Kingdom established by the Statute of Westminster 1931. Statute of Westminster 
(22 & 23 Geo V c 4, Dec. 11, 1931) U.K. 
72 See, e.g.,United States v. Scruggs, 356 F.3d 539 (4th Cir. 2004); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, 
Scruggs Pleads Guilty; Plus a Profile of the “King of Torts,” A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL ETHICS, Mar. 14, 
2008, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scruggs_pleads_guilty/. 
73 See ITAA § 13B(4). 
74 ITA § 23(1)–(3). 
75 See Mareva v. Int’l Bulk Carriers (1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 (A.C.). 
76 See Piller KG v. Mfg. Processes Ltd. (1976) 1 Ch. 55 (A.C.); see also EMI Ltd. v. Pandit, (1975)  
1 All ER 418 (Ch.). 
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In the following case notes, I have sought primarily to isolate reasons for 
decisions as a guide to those who wish to look beyond the bare words of the 
statute.  To this end, most fact situations have been omitted. 
A.  Pacific Heritage Bank v. Radke 
This case concerned the time limits for beginning a suit.77  The defendant’s 
partnership interest was transferred to the trustee on October 15, 1992.78  The 
plaintiff acknowledged that this date was the date his cause of action arose.79  
Default under the defendant’s loan agreement with the plaintiff occurred on 
December 1, 1992.80  Plaintiff did not become aware of the disposition to the trust 
until January 17, 1994.81 
The plaintiff was unable to overcome section 13B(3)(b), which states: “A . . . 
trust shall not be fraudulent as against a creditor of a settlor if the creditor fails to 
bring such action before the expiration of 1 year from the date such . . . 
disposition . . . took place.”82 
Plaintiff argued that “fails” meant “to neglect,” “not remember” or “not 
choose” to act and that here, the date on which he became aware of the disposition 
should be the starting date, January 17, 1994.  Plaintiff’s action began in the Cook 
Islands on October 6, 1994.83 
The court applied what it said was the basic rule of construction and gave the 
words their ordinary meaning and held that the action was time-barred because it 
did not fall within the one-year period provided for in section13B(3)(b).84 
B.  515 S. Orange Grove Owners Association v. Orange Grove Partners  
515 S. Orange Grove Owners Association v. Orange Grove Partners, 
(“Orange Grove cases”) comprises of several parts.85  The first two decisions 
relate to the grant of a Mareva injunction and an appeal against the cancellation of 
the injunction in the first case.86 
                                                          
77   Pac. Heritage Bank v. Radke, (1994) CKHC 8: 168 1994, available at 
http://www.paclii.org//cgi-bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/1994/8.html?query=Radke; Pac. Heritage Bank 
v. Radke, (1994) CKHC 9; 168. 1994, available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/1994/9.html?query=Radk ke. 
78    Pac. Heritage Bank v. Radke, (1994) CKHC 9. 
79    Id. 
80    Id. 
81    Id. 
82   ITAA § 13B(3)(b). 
83  Pac. Heritage Bank v. Radke, (1994) CKHC 8. 
84  Pac. Heritage Bank v. Radke, (1994) CKHC 9. 
85  See 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 3: 208 .1994, 
available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/1995/3.html?query=515 S. Orange 
Grove Owners; 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners (1995) CKHC 9: 
208.1994, available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/1995/9.html?query=515 
S. Orange Grove Owners. 
86  See 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 3; 515 S. 
Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 9. 
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A Mareva injunction was obtained by the plaintiff, and the defendants, 
including the trustee, sought to have it removed.87  The plaintiff alleged inter alia 
that the trustee’s acts were “fraudulent, unconscionable, and [without probity 
and] . . . to the prejudice of the plaintiffs.”88 
The court found that there was no evidence of this allegation and that the 
ordinary conduct of the trustee’s business activities did not gave rise to such a 
conclusion.89 
On appeal, the arguments narrowed to the construction of section 13B(8).90 
The appeal presented two cases: one where the claimant relied on the date of 
an act or omission to establish a cause of action; and one where the claimant 
brought an action on a judgment.91  The court held that in this case the latter 
provision applied, reasoning that the date the California judgment relied on was the 
appropriate date and that the plaintiff’s claim was made within the time limit.  
Accordingly, the Mareva injunction was restored.92 
The court evidently had in mind the fact that had discontinuance of the 
Mareva injunction been confirmed, the plaintiff’s suit would have been precluded 
without a substantive hearing on the merits.  The court was apparently loath to 
permit this and adopted the plaintiff’s argument differentiating dates in then-
subsection (8) when the words themselves do not on their face bear this out.  
The amended subsection deletes the reference to an “action upon a 
judgment,” and now defines the term “cause of action” by reference to “the earliest 
cause of action capable of assertion by a creditor against the settlor of an 
international trust . . . by which that creditor has established (or may establish) an 
enforceable claim against that settlor.”93 
A curious (by today’s standards) argument was then heard by the court when 
the plaintiff argued for publication of the judgment entered on November 6, 1995.  
This argument was opposed by the defendants, who relied on section 23(2).94  The 
court concluded that it would be wrong to suppress publication, and judgment in 
accordance with this reasoning was delivered on December 5, 1995. 
The respondent-defendants then sought leave to appeal against the 
publication judgment of December 5, 1995, though not against the principal 
judgment restoring the Mareva injunction.  Appeal, if allowed, would be to “Her 
Majesty the Queen in Council,”95 otherwise known as the Privy Council, 
comprising judges of the English House of Lords.  This historical right of appeal to 
the English court system survives from colonial times when new colonies did not 
                                                          
87  515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 9. 
88  See 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 3. 
89  Id. 
90  See 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 9; ITAA § 
13B(3)(b).  (section 13B(8) was amended following final resolution of this case to clarify provisions 
relating to the meaning of the phrase “cause of action”). 
91  See 515 S. Orange Grove Owners Ass’n v. Orange Grove Partners, (1995) CKHC 9. 
92  Id. 
93   ITAA § 13B(8)(b). 
94 ITA § 23(2). 
95 See Privy Council (Judicial Committee) Act 1984 § 3(2) (Cook Is.). 
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have senior experienced judges and small colonial populations engendered the risk 
of conflicts of interest.  New Zealand, Australia, and Canada have discontinued the 
right of appeal. 
To succeed, such an application must demonstrate that “the question (to be 
appealed) is one which by reason of its great general or public importance or 
otherwise, ought to be submitted.96 
The respondent-defendants argued that publication of the decision would 
irreparably harm the jurisdiction.  The court held that the arguments did not meet 
the test of “great general or public importance,” and the application for leave was 
denied.  The ITA now provides that edited decisions shall be published unless so 
ordered otherwise by the court.97 
C.  Case No.2 (1996) CKHC 2: CA Plaint No.36 of 1996 Court  of Appeal 
Plaintiffs learned in February 1996 that on the same facts as in the Orange Grove 
cases, the “Victor Trust,” a second trust had been established (the “Evangeline 
Trust”).  After a Mareva injunction was obtained, the trustee sought discharge of 
the Mareva injunction on the basis that the action was time-barred under 
section13B because the settlement took place before the creditor’s cause of action 
arose.98  The plaintiffs argued that the words “accrued” and “or had arisen” created 
different dates.  The court adopted the words “or had arisen” to establish that the 
plaintiffs’ claim was not time barred.  
The Orange Grove cases resulted in substantial revision of sections13B and 
13K in the 1999 amendment,99 such that the objections and differing points of 
interpretation found by the court in support of their decisions in the five hearings 
above were met by a legislative response.  It is characteristic of offshore 
jurisdictions that, in the absence of strong domestic pressures and the protracted 
debate that usually generates, amendment of commercially oriented legislation 
such as the ITA can be achieved quickly and usually without dissent.  
D.  In re XYZ Irrevocable Trust 
This is the telemarketing case well known by reference to parallel U.S. 
litigation100 and the subject of extensive commentary.101  
This was an application for directions by the trustee, ABC, of the XYZ trust 
regarding management and administration of the trust constituted in July 1995 by 
                                                          
96 Id. 
97   ITA §23 (3). 
98   ITAA § 13B(4). 
99 International Trusts Amendment Act 1999 (Cook Is.), 1999 Cook Islands Sessional Legislation, 
No. 3.  
100  In re XYZ Irrevocable Trust (1999) CKHC 5; OA 6.1999, available at 
http://www.paclii.org//cgi-bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/1999/5.html?query= CKHC; 4 FTC v. 
Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999). 
101 See David R. McNair, Anderson in the Court of Appeals – Contempt, Impossibility and Foreign 
Trusts, TR. & TRUSTEES, Sept. 1999, at 27. 
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Mr. and Mrs. A (the “A’s”), as settlors and co-trustees, along with ABC.102  The 
A’s were also protectors of the trust.103 
In May 1998, the A’s informed ABC that the Federal Trade Commissioner 
(“FTC”) had obtained a temporary restraining order against them in the United 
States District Court of Nevada ordering them inter alia to repatriate their assets to 
the U.S. and provide an accounting of those assets to the FTC.104  
In June 1998, ABC informed the A’s that by reason of an “event of duress,” 
as defined in the trust agreement, they had automatically ceased to be co-trustees 
of the trust.105  The event of duress was that they had been the subject of an action 
the aim, purpose or effect of which was the acquisition, expropriation or 
confiscation of any of the assets comprising the property of [the] trust.106  ABC 
declined to comply with the temporary restraining order on the basis that to do so 
would have been in breach of clauses thirty-four and forty-two of the trust 
agreement.107  Those clauses precluded any “Excluded Person,” as defined in the 
trust agreement, from taking any benefit under the trust.108  As a result, the United 
States District Court made an order for the imprisonment of the A’s for contempt 
of court.109  
In July 1998, A advised ABC of his imprisonment, and said he had been 
requested by the FTC and the United States District Court to procure the consent of 
his children to the repatriation of the assets and that if he was able to do so, the 
court would then order A’s release.110  ABC again declined to release the funds.111  
In November 1998, A advised ABC that the FTC and the United States 
District Court were considering other options.  The A’s attorneys formed a new 
Cook Islands international company (“CI”), the sole shareholder of which was the 
FTC. 112 
On December 18, 1998, the A’s executed a Deed of Removal and 
Appointment of Trustee by which they purported to remove ABC as trustee and 
appoint CI as the new trustee.  ABC rejected the deed as invalid.  
On December 22, 1998, a further deed was executed by the A’s and CI, 
described as a Deed of Amendment, the purpose of which was to amend the 
original deed by excluding the FTC from the definition of Excluded Person.  
On the same day, the A’s executed a declaration of resignation whereby they 
resigned as protectors and purported to appoint CI as substitute protector.  
                                                          
102  See Adrian Taylor, Cook Islands High Court Denies Repatriation of Trust Assets to the US, 7 
FIDUCIA 1, (Asiaciti Trust Group Singapore) available at http://www.rjmintz.com/anderson2.html (last 
visited June 6, 2010.  
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  In re XYZ Irrevocable Trust (1999) CKHC 5. 
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  See supra McNair note 101, at 32. 
109  See supra Taylor note 102, at 32. 
110  In re XYZ Irrevocable Trust (1999) CKHC 5. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. 
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For the present proceedings, the A’s executed affidavits deposing that the 
documents had been reviewed by their American attorneys prior to being executed 
and had been executed “on [A’s] own volition without duress.” 
The court had to determine two issues; whether the deeds and declaration 
were executed under duress and whether the effect of the documents was to confer 
a benefit on an Excluded Person.113  
Duress: While it seems likely that the attorney drafting the trust agreement 
intended duress to include a court order for imprisonment for contempt, the judge 
found that the A’s affidavits as to their execution of the documents without duress 
had not been challenged and that the withholding of release from prison for 
contempt of court was lawful according to Nevada law and that the documents 
were therefore not void on this ground.114 
Excluded Person: The trust agreement provided that the protector could not 
exercise any power for the benefit of an Excluded Person.115  The definition of 
Excluded Person in the trust agreement included all “court, administrative and 
judicial bodies, except for the court, administrative or judicial bodies organized 
and empowered under the laws of the Cook Islands.”116  Additionally, it included 
any and all creditors, claimants, judgment creditors etc. of any Settlor, of any 
Trustee, or any Discretionary Beneficiary, or any other Beneficiary under the 
settlement.117 
Chief Justice Quilliam said the issue was not whether or not CI was an 
Excluded Person (it was clearly not), but whether the purpose of the three 
documents was for the “benefit” of an Excluded Person.118  
That, in turn, required a determination as to whether the FTC was an 
administrative body.  The court held it was, and further that it fell within the ambit 
of “claimant,” another prohibited class.119  The court also drew support from the 
FTC’s attempt to change the definition of Excluded Person.120  The Deed of 
Amendment was held to be invalid as having been executed by the settlors in 
purported exercise of a power at a time when, because of an event of duress, they 
no longer had.121   
E.  United States of America v. A Ltd.  
The FTC was awarded twenty million dollars (against A’s company) 
                                                          
113  See supra McNair note 101, at 32. 
114 Chief Justice Quilliam stated that the only authority he had found which may apply was a brief 
passage stating, “The question whether imprisonment or threatened imprisonment does or does not 
constitute duress depends on whether the imprisonment is lawful or unlawful.”  9 Halsbury’s Laws of 
England at ¶ 710. 
115  In re XYZ Irrevocable Trust (1999) CKHC 5. 
116  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  In re XYZ Irrevocable Trust (1999) CKHC 5; see also supra Taylor note 102, at 32. 
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primarily to compensate defrauded customers.122  The customers were not 
themselves deprived of their right to sue.123  The award provided that, in the event  
reparation became impractical or the amount awarded exceeded that required for 
reparation, the surplus was to be paid to the U.S. Treasury as an “equitable 
discourage remedy.”124 
The FTC sued in the Cook Islands to recover trust assets and the trustee ABC 
objected that this amounted to the enforcement of a public law of a foreign state.125  
The court adopted the established proposition of English law that, “English 
[and thus Cook Islands] courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an action; for the 
enforcement, either directly or indirectly, of a penal, revenue, or other public law 
of a foreign state; or founded upon an act of state.”126 
Held: The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 was a regulatory 
provision to prevent and control fraudulent and otherwise illegal trading.  Powers 
given the FTC included those to obtain judgments in excess of appropriate redress 
and to pay any funds to the U.S. Treasury.  It was the substance of the interest 
sought to be enforced which determined whether this was a public law rather than 
the form of action.  The action taken by the FTC was taken to enforce the law and 
was at least partly penal.  It was also a public law sought to be enforced by a 
foreign state for regulatory purposes and it would not be enforced in the Cook 
Islands.127  
It is perhaps indicative of the willingness of English and, by reference, Cook 
Islands courts, compared to the evident reluctance of the United States Supreme 
Court to entertain foreign precedent, that Chief Justice Greig, in his judgment, 
referred favorably to decisions where U.S. precedent has been applied or 
approved.128  
F.  A v. B 
This is the bookstore case (in three parts) which, like In Re XYZ Irrevocable 
Trust above, was the subject of well-publicized parallel U.S. litigation.129  
Part one concerned the plaintiff’s interlocutory application for an order for 
discovery, which the defendant resisted on the ground that to give discovery would 
                                                          
122  United States of America v A Ltd [2001] CKHC 4, available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/2001/4.html?query= CKHC 4. 
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. 
126 See 1 DICEY & MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 97 (12th ed. 1993). 
127 Attorney General v. Ortiz, 1 A.C. 1 (P.C. 1984), aff’d by Attorney-General v. Heinemann 
Publishers Austl. Pty Ltd., 10 N.S.W.L.R. 86 (1987). 
128 See Huntington v. Attrill (1891) A.C. 150 (P.C. 1893) (applying the tests in Wis. v. Pelican Ins. 
Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) and Attorney-General v. Wellington  Newspapers Ltd., (1988) 1 N.Z.L.R. 129, 
where Justice Cook approved Dr. D. F. Mann’s article The International Enforcement of Public Rights 
(1987)).  
129  A v. B (2002) CKHC 5, available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/2002/5.html?query= CKHC 4; Bank of Am.v. Weese, 277 B.R. 241 (D. 
Md. 2002). 
336 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. III:II 
 
constitute a criminal offence under section 23(1) of the act.130  
Then section 23 provided that; “Except where the provisions of this act 
require and subject to this section, it shall be an offence for a person to divulge or 
communicate to any person information relating to the establishment, constitution, 
business undertaking or affairs of a trust.”131 
The court held that the words “except where the provisions of this act 
require” imply that if something had to be done to make the statute work, it was 
permissible to allow it.132  The approach should be to “work out a practical 
interpretation appearing to accord best with the general intention of parliament as 
embodied in the act.”133 
The provisions requiring discovery in the case are those in section 13.134  
That provision would be rendered useless if there could never be full and proper 
discovery, especially bearing in mind that the creditor carries the unusually heavy 
onus of proving beyond reasonable doubt that there was either an intent to defraud 
or that the settlement rendered the insolvent without property by which the 
creditor’s claim, if successful, could be satisfied.135  The application for discovery 
was approved.136 
A. A v. E & Ors.  
Part two concerned a further interlocutory application by the plaintiff 
concerning the defendant’s claim of privilege in respect of discoverable 
documents.137 
Plaintiff alleged that the documents claimed privilege for categories of 
documents where advice was sought or given to allow the first defendants to 
commit a fraud.138  Particulars of the fraud alleged to be sufficient to justify 
inspection by the court included: 
The dishonest acts and intentions of the first defendants as assisted and promoted 
by lawyers and/or advisors as can be proved and/or inferred from the following 
The establishment and creation of the trust, 
The transfer of assets to the trust; and  
At a time when an arbitration case was pending against the first 
                                                          
130 See Privy Council (Judicial Committee) Act 1984, §23(1) (It is significant to note that section 
23 was amended after this decision). 
131  A v. B (2002) CKHC 5. 
132  Id. 
133 Id,  Northland Milk Vendors Assoc. Inc v Northern Milk Ltd. (1988) 1 N.Z.L.R. 530 (Williams, 
J. approving). 
134  A v. B (2002) C.K.H.C. 5. 
135 Id.  
136   Id.  
137   A v. E & Ors, (2002) C.K.H.C. 4, available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CK HC/2002/4.html?query=Case No.2 (1996) CKHC 2. 
138   Id. 10. 
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defendant and. 
The effect (of the transfers) was to leave the first defendants unable to meet 
their obligation to the plaintiff. 
The first defendants denied the allegations. There was no dispute that the court had 
the right to inspect the documents. The central issue for determination [was] the 
scope and application of the so-called fraud exception to the rules.139 
In traversing the rationale of the law, Justice William noted that since at least 
the decision in The Queen v. Cox,140 the law recognized an exception where 
communications are made with intent to facilitate a crime or fraud. 
Since this was the first Cook Islands case to consider the exception in the 
context of a claim under section 13B, the judge reviewed New Zealand, English 
and Australian case law and reports of both the New Zealand and Australian Law 
Reform Commissions.141  
“The theme of the cases and the various suggested codifications is one of 
dishonest purpose.  The scope of the fraud exception goes beyond deceit or fraud 
simpliciter and catches any commercial practice or business dealing that would 
readily be described as dishonest to the point of fraud by a reasonable 
businessman.”142 Justice Williams discussed the Court of Appeal in the Orange 
Grove cases143 where, he said the court “rejected an argument that the purpose of 
the Cook Islands trust legislation was purely and unashamedly the soliciting of 
funds and giving of protection against creditors exercising their rights.”144 
On the standard of proof required, it was noted that a mere allegation is 
insufficient and there must be “some prima facie evidence.”145  However, in this 
case, Williams considered that because section 13B requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, something more was required, namely the standard proposed by 
the New Zealand Law Commission, “a strong prima facie case of fraud or 
dishonest purpose.”146 
Williams also cited Viscount Finlay in O’Rourke v. Darbishire:147 
The court will exercise its discretion, not merely in terms in which the allegation 
[of fraud] is made but also as to the surrounding circumstances for the purpose of 
seeing whether the charge is made honestly and with sufficient probability of its 
truth to make it right to disallow the privilege of professional communication.148 
                                                          
139 Id. 16. 
140 The Queen v. Cox, 1884 14 Q.B. 153 (1884).  
141 A v. E & Ors, (2002) C.K.H.C. 4.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. (“[W]e would be loathe to interpret the International Trusts Act as a statute which was 





147 O’Rourke v. Derbyshire, (1920) A.C. 581 at 604.  
148 A v. E & Ors, (2002) C.K.H.C. 4; see also Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933). 
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On the facts, Williams held that the plaintiff had satisfied the strong prima 
facie test by reference to the establishment of the trust in the shadow of impending 
arbitration and judgment.149 
B. E and Another v. A   
Part three was an appeal against Justice Williams’ above decision to the 
Cook Islands Court of Appeal.150  The court approved Williams’ “strong prima 
facie” test and the application of that test to the facts.151  The appeal was denied.152  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
After twenty years the Cook Islands International Trusts Act remains a 
robustly utilitarian and effective estate protection tool for U.S. clients 
notwithstanding sometimes voracious criticism from U.S. commentators, courts 
and other offshore finance centers.  The competitive advantage achieved by the 
Cook Islands has been recognized.  The ITA has been copied and emulated in 
other offshore jurisdictions and the asset protection trust concept adopted in some 
U.S. states.  While U.S. decisions now seem to focus on impossibility issues in 
contempt proceedings,153 Cook Islands cases demonstrate a focus on issues 
relating to ITAA section 13B.154  A body of Cook Islands precedent is building up 
which demonstrates both the seriousness of the purpose of Cook Islands courts and 
the application of familiar conceptual treatments in well-reasoned judgments.155  
To meet the evidentiary criteria of the ITA, Cook Islands cases demonstrate the 
critical need for stringent analysis of a potential client’s affairs before a trust plan 
is implemented.  
 
 
                                                          
149 A v. E & Ors, (2002) C.K.H.C. 4. 
150   E and Another v. A (2003) CKNZCA 1; CA 8.2002, available at http://www.paclii.org//cgi-
bin/disp.pl/ck/cases/CKHC/2002/4.html?query="A v. E". 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153 See, e.g., Eulich v. United States, No. 3:99-CV-1842-L, 2009 WL 2870004 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 4, 
2009). 
154 Section 13B is the ITAA section corresponding to a fraud claim.  See supra Part II. 
155 See supra Part IV-V. 
